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This paper provides a ﬁrst microeconomic foundation for the institution of mar-
riage. Based on a model of reproduction, mating, and parental investment in chil-
dren, we argue that marriage serves the purpose of attenuating the risk of mating
market failure that arises from incomplete information on individual paternity. Rais-
ing the costs of mating to individuals, marriage circumscribes female inﬁdelity and
mate poaching among men, which reduces average levels of paternal uncertainty in
society. A direct gain in male utility, the latter induces men to invest more in their
putative oﬀspring, a fact that beneﬁts women because of the public good nature of
children. Able to realize Pareto improvements, marriage as an institution is hence
explained as the result of a societal consensus on the need to organize and structure
mating behavior and reproduction in society for the beneﬁt of paternal certainty and
biparental investment in oﬀspring.
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11. Introduction
Marriage ranks among the oldest social institutions. Endorsed by religions, laws, and social
norms throughout human history, it is a permanent ﬁxture in virtually all cultures and of pivotal
importance for the organization and structuring of mating markets. In light of this ubiquity
and centrality in societies, it is little surprising that marriage has caught the growing interest of
economic enquiry. Starting with Gary Becker’s seminal work on the economics of marriage in the
early 1970s (see Becker, 1973/1974), a truly extensive literature on marriage has developed over
the last thirty years that has greatly enriched our knowledge of the family as an economic unit
and added to our understanding of marriage patterns in societies. Despite the numerous advances
made, however, a major gap remains in the economics literature on marriage. Disregarding the
institutional nature of conjugal unions, economic theories of marriage have failed to explain
the general purpose and regulatory function of marital arrangements in societies. Addressing
this gap, this paper contributes to the economics literature on marriage by providing a ﬁrst
microeconomic foundation for the institution of marriage. We argue that marriage in society
serves the purpose of mitigating risks of mating market failure that arise from spillover eﬀects
of promiscuous mating under incomplete information on individual paternity.
Economic theories of marriage in the Beckerian tradition have focused on various beneﬁts to
individuals from joining their production and consumption to explain the existence of conjugal
unions. Potential sources of gain include the ability to exploit economies of scale or compara-
tive advantage through specialization (Becker, 1985), risk sharing (Kotlikoﬀ and Spivak, 1981,
Hess, 2004), the production and consumption of household public goods including own oﬀspring
(Becker 1965; Pollack and Wachter, 1975; Lundberg and Pollak, 1993/1994), or the provision
of credit when capital markets are imperfect (Cox, 1987/1990).1 None of these gains, however,
is conﬁned to individuals in conjugal unions (Weiss, 1997). The same shortcoming applies also
to other beneﬁts that have been associated with marriage in the literature, such as the ability
of co-residing couples to mutually monitor each other’s parenting eﬀort, a theme emphasized in
the works of Willis (1999) and Weiss and Willis (1985, 1993), or the opportunity to economize
on transaction costs within long-term relationships (see, for example, Pollak, 1985). Most eco-
nomic theories of marriage in fact do not provide a deﬁnition of marriage that is distinct from
other forms of interpersonal unions, such as nonmarital cohabitation.2 Legal aspects of marriage
are considered in only a strand of the economics literature. The latter includes theories which
model marriage as a contract between spouses that protects them and their relationship-speciﬁc
investments in case of breakup (see, for example, Landes, 1978; Pollack, 1985), or that transfers
1For surveys of theories of marriage, see, for example, the chapter by Weiss (1997) in the Handbook of Population
and Family Economics, the monograph by Becker (1991), or the recent book by Grossbard-Shechtman (2003).
2This lack of diﬀerentiation between formal and informal unions has characterized the economics literature on
marriage from its very beginning. As noted by Gary Becker’s in the introduction of his seminal paper on the
economics of marriage, for individuals “‘marriage’ simply means that they share the same household” (Becker,
1973, p. 815).
2custodial rights from women to men (Edlund and Korn, 2002). These accounts are, however, still
decidedly partial equilibrium in their treatment of marriage, as none of the features of marriage
considered is in any way accounted for, but simply assumed. As other economic approaches to
marriage, they furthermore treat marriage as an entirely private undertaking that concerns but
those individuals who join a particular conjugal union. These shortcomings exemplify a general,
and indeed signiﬁcant gap in the economics literature on marriage, i.e. the lack of a microe-
conomic foundation for the institution of marriage that can explain why societies throughout
history and across the world have endorsed marriage as the preferred and often only accept-
able form of union between the two sexes and subjected it to various forms of social and legal
sanctions.
Our paper contributes to the economics literature on marriage by providing a ﬁrst such mi-
croeconomic foundation for the institution of marriage. To explain the origin and purpose of
marital arrangements, we integrate economic theories of marriage and fertility in a model of
reproduction, mating, and parental investment in children that takes explicit account of two
fundamental asymmetries between women and men: asymmetry in oﬀspring recognition and
asymmetry in reproductive capacity. Our analysis shows that these asymmetries have a strong
bearing on the respective reproductive strategies pursued by the two sexes, with major impli-
cations for mating market outcomes and eﬃciency. In the absence of regulation, they lead to
excess mating and suboptimal levels of parental investment, that is to individual welfare losses.
Underlying this market failure is incomplete information on individual paternity. The latter
gives rise to externalities if promiscuous mating is unconstrained, that is cuckoldry and the
concomitant risk for men to misattribute parental investment to oﬀspring that is not their own.
We show that an institutional arrangement that restrains promiscuity by raising its costs to
individuals can realize Pareto improvements vis-` a-vis this situation. For the less women and
men engage in extra-pair mating, the more certain, on average, is individual paternity. A direct
gain in utility for men, greater paternity conﬁdence induces larger male parental investment
in children, which beneﬁts women because of the public good nature of child quality. Both
sexes, as a consequence, have a fundamental interest in reducing average levels of paternity
uncertainty in society. In our analysis, the institution of marriage is explained as the result of
this shared interest among individuals to circumscribe promiscuity for the beneﬁt of paternal
certainty and biparental investment in oﬀspring. Deﬁning rules of courtship and norms of part-
nership formation and breakup that govern the kind and the scope of acceptable mating behavior
in societies, marital arrangements largely determine the costs of mating to individuals. These
include implicit costs for activities such as nonmarital sex, adultery, or out-of-wedlock childbear-
ing. Organizing and structuring more than any other institution the operation of the mating
market and reproduction in society, marital arrangements help to mitigate the risk of mating
market failure that arises from female inﬁdelity and mate poaching among men under incomplete
information on individual paternity. Not diﬀerentiating between marital and nonmarital unions,
economic theories of marriage have failed to explain this intimate relationship between marriage
3and reproduction. Although economists generally acknowledge the importance of childbearing
for individual marriage decisions, most theories of marriage even “do not explicitly incorporate
fertility decisions into the analysis” (Willis, 1999, p. S36). Other gains from marriage identiﬁed
in the literature, however, cannot account for the traditionally intersexual nature of conjugal
unions. For none of them accrues any less to groups of individuals of the same sex.
As misattributed fatherhood and mating market failure are universal risks faced by societies,
our foundation of the institution of marriage is capable and general enough to account for the
cross-cultural ubiquity and long history of marital arrangements.3 Providing a rationale for the
traditional status of marriage as the primary place for the bearing and rearing of children in so-
cieties, it can explain the generally inter-sexual nature of conjugal unions. It can also explain the
ubiquitous endorsement and social sanctioning of ﬁdelity between spouses, an intrinsic feature
of marital arrangements hitherto altogether disregarded in the economics literature. Concerns
about misattributed paternity can indeed account for numerous features of conjugal unions and
marriage regimes, such as the rareness of polyandry across societies, the widespread importance
attached to premarital female chastity, or the traditional status of unwed mothers as the sole
legal custodian of their nonmarital oﬀspring.
The importance of misattributed fatherhood for individual and group behavior has been in-
tensively researched only outside economics, among others, in evolutionary biology, sociology,
psychology, and anthropology (see Section 2 for more details), as economists have traditionally
paid little attention to the biological basis of economic behavior. A recent series of papers,
however, suggests that this situation may be slowly changing and that important advances can
be made in our understanding of economic phenomena and human behavior more generally by
broadening the scope of traditional economic enquiry.4
There are growing signs for a demise of marriage, however, at least in industrialized countries.
Once a virtual precondition for childbearing, marriage appears to be increasigly decoupled from
the bearing and rearing of oﬀspring, as evinced by the growth in out-of-wedlock childbearing,
rising rates of divorce, and declining marriage rates. A number of legal, technological, economic,
and societal changes may account for this demise of marriage, including the introduction of uni-
lateral divorce laws, improvements in household technology, the expansion of the welfare state,
and increases in the female command of economic resources. While an analysis of the underly-
ing causes of these changes is beyond the scope of this paper, our theoretical model is shown to
provide a suitable framework for the study of their respective eﬀects on the attractiveness and
eﬀectiveness of marital arrangements in societies.
3The ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle noted as early as 350 B.C.E. that one of the reasons why mothers
seem to love their children more than fathers is the fact that they know better that the children are indeed
their own (Nicomachean Ethics, Book 9, Chapter 7). General concern about cuckoldry has also found vivid
expression in popular proverbs such as “mama’s baby, papa’s maybe”, the modern English equivalent to the
ancient Roman dictum “mater certissima, pater semper incertus” (mother is certain, father always uncertain).
4See, for example, the work by Cox (2003) on intervivos gifts and aspects of paternity uncertainty, Willis (1999)
on out-of-wedlock childbearing, Edlund (1999) on preferences for sons versus daughters, Bergstrom (1996) on
various aspects of families, or Robson (2001) on the biological basis of economic behavior more generally.
4The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 surveys arguments for why the two sex diﬀerences
considered in the analysis are important determinants of the respective mating market behavior
of women and men. It also reviews the empirical literature, mostly from disciplines other than
economics, on the importance of paternity and paternity conﬁdence for the reproductive behavior
of individuals and for the existence of various societal arrangements that regulate the mating,
marriage, and parenting behavior of the two sexes. Section 3 develops and discusses the basic
model. Section 4 characterizes the optimal female and male strategies and explains how these
lead to mating market failure. Using a ﬂexible parameterization, the underlying mechanisms of
our model are illustrated graphically in Section 5. Based on the analytical framework developed
and the results obtained, Section 6 provides a microeconomic foundation for the institution
of marriage, analyses aspects of monogamous, polygynous, and polyandrous marriage regimes,
and explores various legal, technological, economic, and societal trend changes in their eﬀects
on marriage patterns and parental investment levels. Section 7 summarizes the main ﬁndings
and concludes.
2. Background
Outside economics, in evolutionary biology, sociology, anthropology, and psychology, sex dif-
ferences have long been recognized as important determinants of both individual and group
behavior. Asymmetries in oﬀspring recognition and in reproductive capacity between women
and men constitute two prominent examples of such diﬀerences. Both asymmetries arise from
the human mode of reproduction and entail diﬀerent constraints, risks, and incentives for the
two sexes that signiﬁcantly inﬂuence their respective reproductive strategies.
Because of internal fertilization and life birth, women but not men can identify their progeny
with certainty. Men alone, therefore, are susceptible to the risk of cuckoldry. Misattributed
fatherhood constitutes a major threat to the reproductive success of men and entails signiﬁcant
economic costs in terms of both time and resources expended for parenting. Internal fertilization
and gestation, as well as a shorter female than male life-time span of fertility, furthermore sig-
niﬁcantly constrain the reproductive capacity of women relative to that of men. For men more
than women, as a consequence, reproduction is limited by access to fertile mating partners.
Both asymmetries are suggested in the literature to exert a qualitatively similar inﬂuence on the
respective mating behavior of women and men and on the amount of parental investment each
sex is willing to devote to oﬀspring, i.e. the respective reproductive strategies pursued by the two
sexes. In their strive for reproductive success, a function of both the quantity and the quality of
own children, men are argued to maximize oﬀspring quantity rather than quality, with the re-
verse holding true for women (Trivers, 1972; Symons, 1979).5 Men more than women are hence
5A review of the literature on the trade-oﬀ between the quantity and quality of own oﬀspring for the reproductive
success of individuals, known as K-strategies and r-strategies in the biological literature, is provided in Hill
and Kaplan (1999). See also Kaplan and Lancaster (2003).
5predicted to aspire to multiple partners and women to contribute more than men to the rearing
of children.6 Male competition for females, a characteristic feature of the human mating system
noted already by Charles Darwin in his work on the descent of man (Darwin, 1871), raises the
individual odds of misattributed fatherhood when mate poaching among men is common, and
hence adversely aﬀects male parenting levels. For the more uncertain is paternity, the less will-
ing are men on average to invest in their alleged progeny (e.g. Alexander, 1974), and the more
attractive is promiscuity as a means to increase their expected number of oﬀspring (Bateman,
1948) and to diversify potential risks of cuckoldry. As motherhood, in contrast, is certain and
female reproductive capacity limited, women do not have these incentives to engage in promis-
cuity. They have other motives, however, in particular, the prospects of acquiring additional
(yet misplaced) parental investment from other males (Stacey, 1982). For women, therefore,
extra-pair mating essentially remains part of a quality-maximizing reproductive strategy.7
Given the obvious diﬃculties involved in gathering data on perceived paternity, there have
been only few direct tests of its eﬀects on male parenting and mating behavior.8 One of the rare
empirical studies addressing the issue is the recent work by Anderson et al. (2007), which is
based on self-reported retrospective data on the marital, reproductive, and parenting histories
of men in Albuquerque, New Mexico. In the survey, carried out between 1990 and 1993, respon-
dents were asked to indicate their degree of paternity conﬁdence for each pregnancy attributed
to them. Using Cox proportional hazard and ordered logistic regressions, the study ﬁnds low
paternity conﬁdence to increase the likelihood of men to divorce their wives, to lower the time
they spend with their putative children, and to reduce their involvement with the educational
progress of their alleged progeny. Drawing from data of a telephone survey of men in Knox
County, Tennessee, the study by Fox and Bruce (2001) also ﬁnds evidence of a positive rela-
tionship between paternity conﬁdence and measures of paternal care. Their ﬁndings, however,
appear sensitive to the particular measure of fathering employed. The study furthermore lacks
a detailed description of how the measure of paternity conﬁdence employed in the analysis has
been constructed from the sampled survey information.
A wealth of empirical studies on related topics, however, provides ample evidence for the
importance of paternity and paternity conﬁdence for male mating and parenting behavior, as
well as for societal arrangements that govern mating markets in societies. Corroborative pieces
of evidence include higher mate guarding among men (e.g. Buss, 2002), male jealousy and the
sexual double standard (e.g. Daly et al., 1982; Shackelford et al., 2002), and the greater valuation
6Consistent with these reproductive strategies, signiﬁcant sex diﬀerences have been observed across cultures
also in mate preference. Men more than women tend to value signals of reprodutive capacity or fertility in
potential mates, such as features of physical appearance that are associated with youth and health. Women,
in contrast, appear to put greater emphasis on attributes like status or earnings capacity, i.e. cues to the
ability of potential mates to support them and their oﬀspring (see, for example, Buss, 1989).
7For a thorough treatment of the importance of female inﬁdelity and paternal uncertainty for human mating
strategies, see the recent book by Shackelford and Platek (2006).
8Relatively little is also known on rates of actual paternity, for major diﬃculties are similarily encountered in
the collection of reliable data on biological fatherhood (see Anderson, 2006 for a cross-county review of the
available evidence).
6among men of physical resemblance to children as an indirect means to ascertain their paternity
(e.g. Daly and Wilson, 1982; Platek et al., 2002/2003; Volk and Quinsey, 2002). Further evidence
pertains to inferior investment in oﬀspring by patrilineal than matrilineal kin (e.g. Gaulin et al.,
1997), greater investment of brothers into the children of their sisters if own paternity is highly
uncertain (Alexander, 1979), the dependence of rules of inheritance of a man’s property across
societies on paternal conﬁdence (Gaulin and Schlegel, 1980; Hartung, 1985), and the relationship
between average levels of paternal uncertainty and rules governing consanguineous marriages or
inbreeding in societies (Greene, 1978). Moreover, the once exclusive deﬁnition of adultery with
respect to the marital status of women in many societies (e.g. Hadjiyannakis, 1969; Bullough,
1976), the general importance attached to female premarital chastity (e.g. Buss, 1989), the
commonness of polygyny but rareness of polyandry (Murdock, 1967), and the universality of
the paternity presumption in marital arrangements across societies (Edlund, 2005) all bear
witness to the predominantly reproductive nature of marriage as an institution and the pivotal
role of paternal uncertainty for human mating markets. Finally, there is ample evidence that
the presence of both biological parents matters a great deal for the well-being of children.
Stepchildren, in particular, have been shown to suﬀer in a number of ways (e.g. Case et al.,
1999; Daly and Wilson, 1985; Wilson and Daly, 1987).
3. The Model
This section develops a model of reproduction, mating behavior, and parental investment in
children under asymmetries in oﬀspring recognition and reproductive capacity between the two
sexes. The model is kept deliberately parsimonious in that no more assumptions are made than
needed to illustrate our theory of the institution of marriage as a societal response to mating
market failure arising from the aforementioned two asymmetries. We begin our description of
the model in Section 3.1 with the speciﬁcation of the preferences, endowments, and reproductive
technologies of women and men. Child quality as the result of parental investment is modeled
in Section 3.2. Completing the discussion of the model, Section 3.3 deﬁnes equilibrium in the
aggregate mating market.
3.1. Preferences, Endowments, and Reproductive Technologies
Consider a society populated by a large number of single-period lived fertile women and men
with equal preferences, where individuals of the same sex are homogeneous in terms of their re-
spective endowments and reproductive technologies. Individuals are rational and can spend their
economic resources on two competing uses: non-reproductive consumption and reproduction.
Resources devoted to non-reproductive consumption may hence be viewed as the opportunity
cost of resources spent on reproduction. Resources spent on reproduction consist of expenditures
7for mating and parenting. Furthermore, women and men are assumed to mate for reproductive
purposes only.
We ﬁrst consider females. Women are endowed with wealth, time, and other economic re-
sources, which are summarized by variable Y~. They derive separable utility W~ from non-
reproductive consumption C~ and reproductive success, which is a function of both the (discrete)














To account for physiological constraints in female fertility, the reproductive capacity of women
is assumed to be bounded by an upper limit. Following Willis (1999), we normalize this upper
limit to one, i.e. K~ ∈ {0,1}. As women are homogeneous, this assumption implies that the
average number of children per woman is also either 0 or 1. The functions U and V are assumed
to be twice diﬀerentiable in their respective arguments. U is increasing at a diminishing rate,
i.e. U′′ < 0 < U′, and V has the following properties:9
V (0,0)=V (0,Q)=V (K,0)=0 and VKK,VQQ < 0 < VK,VQ,VKQ; ∀ K,Q > 0, (2)
i.e. both mating and parental investment into child quality Q are required for female repro-
ductive success. Mating is costly for both sexes. The respective cost of an additional partner
for each sex is determined on the aggregate mating market and treated as exogenously given
by individuals. For a woman, mating a male individual is assumed to require marginal cost s~
relative to female non-reproductive consumption. Child quality too has its price. Denoting by
a~ the resources at which an additional female contribution Q~ to total child quality Q can be
obtained, each woman faces the following budget constraint:
Y~ = C~ + s~N~ + a~K~Q~, (3)
where N~ is the number of male partners a female has. Choosing N~ and her investment in
child quality Q~, a woman maximizes her utility (1) subject to her budget constraint (3).
We next turn to men. Like women, men are assumed to have identical preferences and
endowments Y| and derive utility from non-reproductive consumption and reproductive success.
Unlike women, however, men are restricted in their reproductive capacity only by access to
fertile members of the opposite sex (Bateman, 1948). They may therefore father more than one
child by mating several women. Moreover, unlike women, men do not recognize their oﬀspring.
Being rational, however, men can infer the total number of male mates N~ each of their female
partners has in equilibrium. For a child born by one of his female partners, a man’s probability
of fatherhood δ is therefore inversely related to the number of male partners N~ the female has
9The assumption that V is twice diﬀerentiable with respect to discrete K can be relaxed, as long as V is
monotonously increasing and strictly concave in K.
8mated, i.e.:
δ = N−1
~ ⇔ 1 − δ = 1 − N−1
~ , (4)
where the second equation gives the degree of paternal uncertainty experienced by the man.
If δ is equal to one, i.e. women are monogamous, a man can be absolutely certain about his
biological parenthood. If women are promiscuous, however, paternity is uncertain. In this case,
the actual but unknown number of own oﬀspring K| of a man that mates N| females can be
any integer up to and including N|, i.e. K| ∈ {0,..,N|}. Given N| and δ, the probability of a









Denoting by E the expectations operator under the above binomial distribution, the expected
number of oﬀspring Ke
| of a man with N| female partners is hence given by:
Ke
| ≡ E [K|] = δN|. (6)
Because of asymmetry in oﬀspring recognition, therefore, men unlike women only maximize their
expected utility. Denoting the latter by W|, the objective function of a man reads:
W| (C|,K|,Q) = U (C|) + E [V (K|,Q)]. (7)
Mating a female individual requires marginal cost s| in terms of male non-reproductive con-
sumption. Denoting further by a| the resources at which a marginal male contribution to child
quality can be obtained, a man faces the following budget constraint:
Y| = C| + s|N| + a|N|q|. (8)
By choosing the number of his female partners N| and the level of his quality investment per
child q|, a man maximizes expected utility (7) subject to his budget constraint (8).
3.2. Parental Investment and Child Quality
Child quality Q is determined by female and male investments in children. As motherhood is
certain, the biological mother of a child is the only female that contributes to its quality. Among
men, however, all partners of a mother qualify as potential fathers. As a consequence, all male
partners of a mother will invest in the quality of her child. Total child quality Q is therefore
composed of the parental investment of the biological mother (Q~) and the sum of the individual
contributions (q|) of her male partners. Note that as Q enters into the utility functions of both
women and men (see equations (1) and (7) above), maternal investment in children aﬀects male
utility and vice versa. As in Weiss and Willis (1985), therefore, child quality has the character
9of a public good. Moreover, if N~ > 1, the true but unknown biological father beneﬁts from
contributions of his male competitors to the quality of his child.
Child quality Q is assumed to be the result of a constant elasticity of substitution aggregation
procedure with maternal investment in child quality Q~ and the total sum of male contributions












where parameter α weighs the respective contributions of the two sexes, and η measures the
degree of substitutability between female and male contributions to the quality of a child. This
very general speciﬁcation permits to study a whole spectrum of possible aggregation procedures,
ranging from perfect complementarity (η → 0) to perfect substitutability (η → ∞), where
η = 1 corresponds to a Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation. While the actual degree of substitutability
between female and male contributions to child quality is diﬃcult if not impossible to determine
in practice, it seems fair to say that both extrema, i.e. η → 0 and η → ∞, are rather unlikely.
In equilibrium, symmetry among male individuals implies that the quality investment q
(i)
| of
a potential father i in a certain child is equal to the quality investment q| of a representative
man in one of his potential oﬀspring. Total male contributions to the quality of a particular
child are therefore given by the product of its mother’s number of mating partners N~ and the






| = N~q|. (10)
3.3. Mating Market
The individual reproductive strategies of women and men have to be consistent in equilibrium
with a situation of mating market clearing. Let P~ (P|) denote the mass of the female (male)
population in society. The mating market clears when the number of male partners per women







Per match, total mating costs s accrue, which reﬂect all costs associated with reproductive
mating, including the monetized values of social, legal, and religious conventions. A detailed
discussion of the determination of s is provided in Section 6.1. For the moment, we assume s to
be exogenous, a deadweight loss, and shared between the two sexes:
s = s~ + s|. (12)
10In equilibrium, s~ and s| are determined by market forces, i.e. by the respective relative
valuations (demands for) and supplies of women and men for another partner of the opposite
sex. Mating market clearing is hence achieved through the price mechanism. Like an invisible
hand or a central dating agency, it sets, for a given value of s, the respective mating costs of
women and men to levels that are consistent with a situation of mating market clearing.
In reality, of course, societies rarely set s. Rather they try to govern directly the respective
costs of mating to men and in particular to women. These costs assigned by society, however,
need not coincide with the actual costs that women and men have to bear on the mating market.
For market forces, i.e. the price mechanism, will entail some redistribution of these costs across
the two sexes in the form of compensation or side payments, should the mating market fail to
clear.10 Our modeling assumption that s is set by society is therefore rather innocuous.
4. Analysis
According to our theory, the institution of marriage serves the purpose of attenuating the risk
of mating market failure that arises from incomplete information on individual paternity. In
this section, we solve our model for the optimal individual reproductive strategies of the two
sexes, and show that these do indeed lead to mating market failure. For individuals, behaving
non-cooperatively, fail to internalize the social costs of promiscuous behavior, which consist of
resources expended in excess of the minimum required for reproduction and direct utility losses
for men because of uncertain paternity.
We proceed as follows. Sections 4.1 and 4.2 derive and discuss the respective optimal strategies
of women and men, and explore the inﬂuences on these strategies of various parameters in the
model. Section 4.3 shows how these individually optimal strategies lead to mating market failure.
4.1. Limited Reproductive Capacity and Optimal Female Strategies
Suppose agents are better oﬀ if they participate in mating, i.e. they can attain a higher level of
utility than their reservation utility U(Y ), Y ∈ {Y~,Y|}. In this case, the average number of














Mating an additional man increases the utility of a woman as long as the following inequality
holds:













10Taxation of but one sex is in fact ruled out by our market clearing condition (11).
11where C
N~
~ is the non-reproductive consumption of a woman with N~ male partners, and QN~
denotes the total quality of her child when N~ male partners invest in her oﬀspring. The optimal
number of male partners for a woman is therefore such that the loss in utility from reduced non-
reproductive consumption is less than or equal to the increase in utility from higher child quality
when mating an additional partner. The only beneﬁt of promiscuity to a woman are therefore
the individual contributions to child quality q| of her male partners. Female mating costs per
man s~, as a consequence, can be viewed as the marginal cost to a woman of securing an
additional male contribution to the quality of her child, i.e. of pursuing such a quality-oriented
reproductive strategy. An increase in s~ will hence lead to a decline in the optimal number of
male partners per woman, unless men increase suﬃciently their individual contributions to child
quality.











i.e. at the optimum a marginal female contribution to child quality has to equate the marginal
loss in non-reproductive utility to the marginal increase in utility due to higher child quality.
Note that for Q < Q~, which is equivalent to Q| < Q~, a reduced female dependence on
male contributions, i.e. an increase in η, will lead to a reallocation of female resources from
non-reproductive consumption to parenting.
These optimal strategies of a woman imply that her allocation of resources between mating
and parenting is determined by just three factors: the ratio of female to male child quality
contributions Q~/Q|, the measure of the relative contribution shares of the two sexes α, and
the elasticity of substitution η between female and male contributions to the quality of a child.
A greater female command of economic resources Y~, therefore, increases ceteris paribus both
her reproductive and non-reproductive expenditures, but leaves her distribution of reproductive
resources across mating and parenting unaltered. In equilibrium, a higher female demand for
male partners will of course also entail a price eﬀect, i.e. female and male shares in total mating
costs adjust, so that the optimal behavior of both sexes will be aﬀected too. A change in a~, in
turn, gives rise not only to an income eﬀect of the kind just described, but also to a substitution
eﬀect, as the relative prices of competing uses are changed. In particular, a fall in a~ will induce
a reallocation of resources from non-reproductive consumption to reproduction.
4.2. Uncertain Paternity and Optimal Male Strategies
Treating the probability of biological fatherhood δ as exogenously given, a male individual
chooses N| and q| to maximize his expected utility:
{q|,N|} = argmax{U (Y| − s|N| − a|N|q|) + E [V (K|,Q)]}. (16)
12An application of the law of iterated expectations shows that adding one additional partner to
a given number of female partners N| increases the expected utility of a man, as long as the
following inequality holds:
δE [V (K| + 1,Q) − V (K|,Q)] ≥ U(C
N|





| is the consumption expenditure of a man with N| female partners. In other words,
the expected increase in male utility derived from an additional reproductive success weighted
by the probability of biological fatherhood (δ) has to equal or outweigh the loss in utility caused
by reduced non-reproductive consumption when resources are transferred to the mating mar-
ket. Promiscuity is therefore attractive to a man, because it increases his expected number of
oﬀspring. Male mating costs per female partner s| can hence be interpreted as the marginal
cost to a man of pursuing such a quantity-oriented reproductive strategy. An increase in s|,
therefore, has to be accompanied for a man by a suﬃcient increase in his expected utility from
own oﬀspring to leave his optimal number of female partners unaltered.
The ﬁrst order necessary condition for the optimal contribution to child quality of a man is
given by:







The interpretation of (18) is analogous to the respective condition for females. Note that N|
appears on the left-hand side of equation (18) because a man invests in the children of all of his
female partners. Note also that an increase in the number of male competitors N~ scales down
the Q/Q| ratio and reduces the expected marginal utility from child quality. Because of the
latter, a man would lower his investment in child quality, which in turn reduces his marginal
utility of non-reproductive consumption and increases his expected marginal utility of child
quality. As long as Q| < Q, which is equivalent to Q| < Q~, a similar shift of male resources
to non-reproductive consumption occurs for lower degrees of female dependence on male child
quality contributions, i.e. for higher levels of η. As pointed out before, the true but unknown
biological father of a child therefore beneﬁts from the quality investments of other men.
The allocation of reproductive resources by men between mating and parenting is not only
determined by Q~/Q|, α, and η, as in the case of females, but also by three other factors. These
are the probability of fatherhood δ, the sex ratio φ, and the concavity of the function V with
respect to the quantity and the quality of own oﬀspring. The income eﬀect induced by a greater
male command of economic resources Y| therefore deviates ceteris paribus from the one in the
female case. In particular, men devote a larger share of (any additional) reproductive resources
to mating than women, i.e. they pursue a reproductive strategy that emphasizes child quantity
rather than quality. In equilibrium, of course, a higher demand among men for female partners
would also result in a larger male share in total mating costs, so that female behavior is aﬀected
as well. Finally, and as for women, a fall in a| has both an income and a substitution eﬀect.
13As the preceding discussion has shown, promiscuity is attractive to both sexes, albeit for
diﬀerent reasons. Men may increase their expected number of children through extra-pair mat-
ing, but women can gain only additional male contributions to the quality of their children.
For women, therefore, promiscuity essentially remains part of a quality-maximizing strategy.
This diﬀerential incentive structure for women and men is consistent with the earlier noted
quality-quantity distinction in the reproductive strategies pursued by the two sexes.
4.3. Mating Market Failure
Promiscuous behavior, although optimal from an individual perspective, entails social welfare
losses. Not only do mating expenditures exceed the social minimum required for reproduc-
tion, but extra-pair mating endangers male reproductive success by making individual paternity
uncertain. Acting non-cooperatively, women and men fail to internalize these spillover eﬀects
when deciding on their respective optimal number of partners, which leads to excess mating
and ultimately mating market failure.11 Although the two sexes would beneﬁt if all women
were monogamous and men refrained from mate poaching, individually each woman and man
has strong shirking incentives. The prospect of a woman to attract additional male quality
contributions and the possibility of a man to increase his expected number of oﬀspring through
extra-pair mating prevent coordination. A general increase in the cost of mating, however, can
mitigate this market failure. In other words, Pareto improvements can be achieved, if mating
in excess of the minimum required for reproduction and hence average levels of paternal un-
certainty are reduced. A graphical illustration of this line of argument is provided in the next
section.
5. A Graphical Illustration
We use a very general parameterization of our model and change in the following to a continuous
choice framework.12 Separable utility of women and men is chosen to be isoelastic in non-
reproductive expenditures and Cobb-Douglas in the quantity and quality of own children (see
equations (1) and (7)):
U (C) = γ
C1−σ − 1
1 − σ
and V (K,Q) = (1 − γ)KκQθ, (19)
where γ,κ,θ ∈ (0,1), and σ > 0. Parameter γ, a measure of the degree of parental altruism
toward oﬀspring, weights the two sources of utility.13 Parameter σ is the absolute value of the
elasticity of marginal utility with respect to the non-reproductive usage of endowments, and
11In other words, equilibrium allocations of resources will diﬀer from the social optimum. A detailed discussion
of the social optimum and of the cooperative reproductive strategies required for its attainment are provided
in Appendix A.
12The continuous choice ﬁrst order necessary conditions are provided in Appendix B.
13Parental altruism toward oﬀspring is a special case of concern for biological relatives (Hamilton, 1964a/b).
14parameters κ and θ determine the degree of concavity of utility with respect to the quantity
and quality of own children. For our baseline speciﬁcation, we normalize the endowments of
both sexes to one and set parameters α, γ, κ, and θ to one half. Furthermore, we assume
logarithmic preferences, Cobb-Douglas aggregation of parental contributions to child quality,
and a balanced sex ratio (σ = η = φ = 1). The qualitative inﬂuence of most parameters is very
intuitive, with the exception of the degree of substitutability between female and male child
quality contributions (η). Its role will therefore be studied in greater detail in Section 5.3. Later
sections tie up with this discussion and vary also some of the other parameters (see Sections 6.2
and 6.3).
The following three subsections explore the eﬀects of broad variations in the level of total
mating costs s and per-unit child quality costs a on the equilibrium number of partners per
individual and on the degree of paternal uncertainty experienced by men (Section 5.1), the
levels and shares of female and male contributions to child quality and its overall level (Section
5.2), and the individual welfare of women and men (Section 5.3). For our line of argument, the
eﬀects of variations in total mating costs are of central importance. As we will see, increases
in s lessen the mating market failure that arises from uncoordinated mating behavior under
incomplete information on individual paternity.
5.1. Mating Costs, Number of Partners, and Paternal Uncertainty
The two diagrams of Figure 1 document how equilibrium female and male mating costs change in
reaction to variations in overall mating costs s and in per-unit child quality costs a = a~ = a|,
which are measured in percent of an individual’s endowment. As can be seen, both s~ and s|
increase in s. Male mating costs, however, exceed female mating costs over the entire range of
total mating costs considered in the diagrams. The latter ﬁnding reﬂects the generally greater
valuation of promiscuity among men than women because of the diﬀerent reproductive strategies








































Market clearing female and male mating costs.
Left: s~ absolute. Right: s~ relative to total mating costs.
As shown in Figure 2, the equilibrium number of partners N = N~ = N| per individual
and, in consequence, paternal uncertainty 1−δ decline monotonically, as mating becomes more
15costly for both sexes. This inverse relation between mating costs and paternity uncertainty is
of central importance to our foundation of marriage (see Section 6.1). For it implies that the
very source of mating market failure can be easily attenuated in society by raising the costs of
mating to individuals. Increases in the level of per-unit child quality costs also tend to reduce






































Equilibrium number of partners and implied paternal uncertainty.
Left: Number of partners N. Right: Paternal uncertainty 1 − δ.
5.2. (Parental) Investment in Child Quality
An increase in total mating costs makes parental investment for a given child more attractive
for both sexes (Figure 3). Mating expenditures of women and men in fact rise too. Measured
by their expenditure share in total resources devoted to reproduction, however, child quality
investments become relatively more important for both sexes. As paternity gets more certain






































Female and individual male contributions to the quality of a child.
Left: Female contribution Q~. Right: Individual male contribution q|.
Whether total child quality Q rises or falls when mating costs increase depends on the relative
rates at which the number of male contributors (partners) N~ to the quality of a child declines
and the level of individual male contributions q| rises, i.e. how total male contributions Q|
change (see equation (10)). As shown in the ﬁrst diagram of Figure 4, total male contributions
to child quality Q| do increase when mating becomes more costly. As maternal investment in
16the quality of a child has been shown to increase as well in the level of mating costs, overall
child quality Q unambiguously rises in s. A mother’s share in total child quality, however,
declines markedly as fewer male partners contribute more in sum to the quality of her child. As
a consequence, both men (directly) and women (indirectly) beneﬁt from lower levels of paternal
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Total male contributions and female share in parental investment per child.
Left: Total male contributions Q|. Right: Q~ relative to Q~ + Q|.
5.3. Welfare
As we have seen, the equilibrium number of partners and the degree of paternal uncertainty
decline in the level of mating costs, while overall child quality and the male share in total child
investments rises. Men, therefore, beneﬁt primarily from lower levels of paternal uncertainty
when mating becomes more costly, and women proﬁt from greater male contributions to child
quality. We next explore how diﬀerent levels of mating costs aﬀect the utility of women and
men. Figure 5 plots the welfare of women W~ and the expected welfare of men W| for diﬀerent
mating costs s and child quality costs a. As is evident, for all values of a, the utility of women
and the expected utility of men increase monotonically in the level of mating costs. Welfare in
the economy, therefore, unambiguously rises if the deadweight costs of mating are increased, and
promiscuity and paternal uncertainty decline. Reducing the risk of misattributed fatherhood in






































Welfare of women and expected welfare of men.
Left: Female welfare W~. Right: Expected male welfare W|.
17To check the robustness of this central result with respect to diﬀerent degrees of substitutabil-
ity between female and male contributions to child quality η, Figure 6 plots the utility of women
and the expected utility of men for diﬀerent levels of s and η, holding per-unit child quality costs
constant. For low values of η, i.e. for low degrees of substitutability, the (expected) welfare of
(men) women increases strictly in the level of mating costs s. For higher values of η, however,
the respective curves become u-shaped, a change that sets in earlier for men. Welfare levels
attained by both sexes at suﬃciently high levels of mating costs nevertheless continue to exceed
those at low levels of mating costs. Men and women are therefore always strictly better oﬀ at
some high level of mating costs. A decrease in child quality costs a, in turn, raises the respective
welfare of women and men for a given level of mating costs and compresses the u-shaped welfare
curves such that a higher level of welfare than at baseline is attained by both sexes already at




























































Welfare of women and expected welfare of men with respect to η.
Left: Female welfare W~. Right: Expected male welfare W|.
6. Marriage
In the analysis so far, mating costs have been treated in generic terms only and their level has
been varied but exogenously. In Section 6.1, we explore the nature and the determination of
mating costs in detail, arguing that their level in society is largely a function of the strictness
of the particular marital arrangement in force. Section 6.2 discusses monogamous, polygynous,
and polyandrous marriage regimes, explores their underlying determinants, and describes their
common features as well as diﬀerences, showing that many a characteristic that is shared or
peculiar to one regime can indeed be explained by the concern of men and society about paternal
uncertainty in reproduction. Finally, Section 6.3 discusses a number of legal, economic, and
technological trend changes that may have contributed to the decline of marriage observable in
many countries over the last century.
6.1. The Institution of Marriage
In an archaic world, mating is rather inexpensive, being subject to little more than shoe-leather
costs. In civilizations, however, mating costs tend to be much larger. Being determined and
18enforced by social, legal, and religious conventions, mating costs reﬂect rules of courtship and
norms of partnership formation and breakup that govern the kind and the scope of acceptable
mating behavior in societies. Once a virtual precondition for childbearing and for a long time
the only tolerable form of union between the two sexes, marriage remains to the present day the
single most important social institution in the mating market. Marital arrangements, viewed
broadly, still determine directly or indirectly the costs to individuals, among others, of divorce,
adultery, informal cohabitation, and out-of-wedlock childbearing. In short, the stricter are
marital arrangements in societies, the more costly is promiscuous behavior to individuals, and
the more circumscribed in consequence is mating.
In the context of our model, the stringency of marital arrangements is measured by the
level of mating costs. As these are inversely related to the degree of paternal uncertainty,
and welfare-enhancing if set to suﬃciently high levels, women and men by consensus would
favor the enactment and enforcement of marital arrangements. If prevalent social norms reﬂect
majority preferences, then marriage as an institution can be explained as the result of this
shared interest among individuals to reduce average levels of paternal uncertainty in society.
This microeconomic foundation for the institution of marriage is capable of accounting not only
for the universality and long history of this social institution. It can also explain the traditional
role of marriage as the primary place for the bearing and rearing of children in societies, and
hence the generally intersexual nature of marital unions. Furthermore, our foundation provides a
convincing rationale for a feature of conjugal unions hitherto altogether disregarded by economic
theories of marriage, i.e. the ubiquitous social endorsement and enforcement of ﬁdelity between
spouses.
Asymmetries in oﬀspring recognition and in reproductive capacity between the two sexes are
instrinsic features of the human mode of reproduction. Misattributed fatherhood and mating
market failure are therefore ubiquitous risks faced by societies and in no way conﬁned to par-
ticular cultures, times, economic systems, or regions of the world. Actual marriage regimes, no
doubt, exihibit great diversity, as societies have responded diﬀerently to these risks, depending
on the speciﬁc environmental, technological, and demographic circumstances encountered. In
the next section, we explore this diversity in greater detail by analyzing its most prominent real-
izations (monogamy, polygyny, and polyandry) and the particular circumstances that may give
rise to them.14 The respective prevalences, common features, and idiosyncratic characteristics
of these marriage regimes are shown to provide ample evidence for the ubiquitous importance
of paternal uncertainty and limited female reproductive capacity for individual mating behavior
and societal arrangements governing the mating market.
14We ignore group marriages, i.e. conjugal unions between several husbands and wives, as such arrangements
have at no time been predominantly practiced in societies (see Table 1). A likely reason for this is suggested
by our analysis. By dissolving group marriages and rearranging their members in smaller unions, paternal
uncertainty can easily be reduced, and Pareto improvements hence generally be attained.
19Table 1: Marriage Regimes and their Prevalences in 1267 Societies
N % Marriage regime
186 14.7 monogamy
453 35.8 occasional polygyny ) 1041 societies
87 6.9 common polygyny (perferentially sororal) with polygyny




Source: Murdock’s Ethnographic Atlas Codebook, 1998 World Cultures 10(1): 86-136.
6.2. Marriage Regimes: Monogamy, Polygyny, and Polyandry
The most basic classiﬁcation scheme of marriage regimes is trichotomous and based on the
respective number of partners that a man or woman may respectively have in a conjugal union.
In monogamous marriage regimes, conjugal unions consist of only one man and one woman. In
polygynous regimes, a man may have several wives, and in polyandrous regimes, one woman
may have several husbands.15 In the following, we ﬁrst explore features common to all three
marriage regimes and discuss some of their idiosyncratic characteristics, before turning to a
formal analysis of their respective functionings and underlying causes within the context of our
theoretical model.
As to common features, the most basic characteristic to note is that in all three marriage
regimes, conjugal unions are intersexual in nature, i.e. they involve at least one member of
each sex. This ubiquitous trait is extremely important, for it underscores that reproduction
must be of central importance for the institution of marriage, as well as for individual marriage
decisions. It is surprising indeed that this fact has been so little appreciated in economic theories
of marriage. Not only are men and women treated largely as generic actors, but most theories
also lack an explicit account of fertility decisions in their analyses (Weiss, 1997). Own oﬀspring,
however, is the only household good that requires inputs of both sexes for its production. No
other motive for marriage identifed in the economics literature, such as the production and
consumption of tangible household goods or the ability of inter-personal unions to engage in risk
sharing, necessarily requires conjugal unions to be intersexual in nature. Neither does any of
these motives arise from a market failure that can explain why societies since time immemorial
have regulated the mating behavior of individuals by institutionalizing, enforcing, and promoting
intersexual marriages. A second common feature, and one of particular importance for our line of
argument, is that all marriage regimes assign exclusive reproductive property rights to members
15Actual mating and marriage patterns in societies, however, rarely conform to this stylized trichotomy. Not
only do monogamous societies often exhibit a sizeable degree of serial polygamy, but in nearly half (43.5%)
of all polygynous cultures, polygyny occurs merely occasionally. Moreover, all cultures commonly classiﬁed
as polyandrous also permit polygynous unions (Daily and Wilson, 1983, p. 286-288). Finally, although most
societies have not been exclusively monogamous, most marriages in fact have been (Wright, 1994, p. 91).
20of a conjugal union (Wilson and Daly, 1992). For adultery is universally condemned, traditionally
all the more so, however, if committed by women.16 Similarly, premarital chastity is in general
cherished if not demanded more of women than it is of men. This double standard has been
and still is widely observable (Buss, 1989) and vividly underscores the ubiquity and signiﬁcance
of concerns about paternal uncertainty in reproduction. Finally, all marriage regimes know
the legal principle of presumed paternity (see, for example, Edlund, 2005). In monogamous
and polygynous marriages, a child born to a married wife is automatically recognized as her
husband’s oﬀspring before the law. In polyandrous marriages, in turn, either one or several
husbands are bestowed with, and consequently share, legal paternity and custodial rights and
obligations (Gough, 1959, p. 32). As the latter generally includes the support of oﬀspring, and
legal recognition of fatherhood may be disputed or even denied in case a child is born out-of-
wedlock, the legal paternity presumption provides a strong incentive for women to procreate in
marriage only.
The relative prevalence of diﬀerent marriage regimes and their individual features are no less
instructive about the general importance of asymmetry in oﬀspring recognition and reproduc-
tive capacity between the two sexes for the mating, marriage, and reproductive behavior of
individuals. As noted already by Becker (1974), paternal uncertainty suﬃces to explain why
polyandrous societies have been far less common than polygynous ones throughout human his-
tory.17 For polyandrous marriages, by their very nature, entail a greater risk of misattributed
paternity than do polygynous marriages. Concerns about paternal uncertainty can furthermore
account for two prominent features of polyandrous societies. First, polyandrous marriages are
often sequential in nature, i.e. share features of serial monogamy, that do allow husbands some
conﬁdence of paternity (Daly and Wilson, 1983). Second, polyandrous marriages are almost
always fraternal (Low, 2007). Fraternal polyandrous marriages are conjugal unions in which
several brothers are married to the same woman. While individual fatherhood in such arrange-
ments may be highly uncertain, the biological relatedness of husbands ensures that children born
to a wife in a fraternal union are at least of the same patrilineal family or blood line. Sororal
marriages, i.e. marriages in which the wives of a husband are sisters, are in contrast rarely ob-
served in societies in which polygyny is common (see Table 1). This predominance of fraternal
marriages in polyandrous societies and rareness of sororal marriages in polygynous societies can
easily be explained by concerns about paternity uncertainty. Asymmetry in the reproductive
capacity between the two sexes likewise encourages polygyny and discourages polyandry. For
limited individual female reproductive capacity constitutes a binding constraint on the number
of oﬀspring that a man may father only in polyandrous marriages, not in conjugal unions that
are polygynous.18
16The cross-cultural study of Betzig (1989) ﬁnds female inﬁdelity to be the most common cause of divorce. Female
sterility ranks third in importance among the causes for marital dissolution surveyed.
17Only 0.3% of the 1267 societies recorded in Table 1 are polyandrous, whereas 82.2% are polygynous.
18As noted already by Malthus (1826, Book I, Chapter XI), limited female reproductive capacity provides an
eﬃcient check on population growth in polyandrous societies.
21We next turn to a more formal analysis of monogamous, polygynous, and polyandrous mating
markets within the context of our theoretical model. Primary causes of polygamous marriage
regimes suggested in the literature include an unbalanced sex ratio, heterogeneity among mem-
bers of a sex, and complementarities between male and female inputs to the production of
household goods (Becker, 1973/74 and 1991; see also Grossbard, 1980). Our model can straight-
forwardly be applied to examine the inﬂuence of the ﬁrst and the last of these three cases on the
respective tendencies of societies to evolve either polygynous or polyandrous traits. Moreover, it
can easily be extended for analyzing also the second case. As the following discussion will show,
concerns about uncertain paternity and a higher male than female reproductive capacity at all
times reinforce polygynous tendencies and attenuate polyandrous that may arise in the mating
market.
In our model, a fall in the male / female sex ratio (φ) renders men more and women less
promiscuous, i.e. mating becomes on average more polygynous in nature.19 Men will have more
children (as they have more female partners) and they will be more certain about their individual
paternity (as female promiscuity is lower). A rise in the sex ratio, in contrast, makes women
more and men less promiscuous, i.e. a relative scarcity of women causes mating to assume
more polyandrous traits. Men will have less children (as they now have less female partners)
and they will be more uncertain about their individual fatherhood (as female promiscuity has









. Because of asymmetries in
oﬀspring recognition and in reproductive capacity, however, the incentives of men to engage in
promiscuous mating in a low sex ratio environment are generally greater than the incentives of
women to engage in promiscuous mating in a high sex ratio environment. A low sex ratio society
is therefore more likely to introduce a polygynous marriage regime than is a high sex ratio, but
otherwise identical, society likely to settle for a polyandrous marriage regime.





. As men in our model are valued by women for their contributions
to child quality only, a more wealthy man, even if he is more promiscuous, will always be pre-
ferred by a woman to a less wealthy man, as long as he contributes more to the quality of her
child. The more unequal are men, i.e. the more dispersed is wealth among potential husbands,
the more will they diﬀer in their ability to engage in promiscuous mating. Rich men may attract
several female partners (engage in polygynous mating), whereas men of low economic status may
have to be content with but a single female (remain monogamous), or even none (stay single).
Polygynous cultures, both past and present, seem to conform well with this characterization
(see, for example, Betzig, 1992/95, for evidence on ancient Greece, the Roman Empire, and
19As noted by Becker (1974), decidedly tilted sex ratios due to wartime deaths of men have at times encouraged
the spread of polygyny. A shortage of black marriageable men, among others due to high rates of incarnation
and premature death, has also been argued to underlie the generally lower marriage rates among blacks in the
US (Wilson, 1987; Brien, 1997).
22various European cultures in the Middle Ages).20 Women, in contrast, are valued by men not
only for their parenting, but also for their reproductive capacity. For men, therefore, a more
wealthy woman, even if she invests more in child quality, does not need to be more attractive
as a mating partner than a less wealthy woman if she is also more promiscuous. In addition, a
wealthy woman has ceteris paribus less incentive than a wealthy men to engage in promiscous
mating, as all she may gain are greater male parenting contributions. As in the case of an
unbalanced sex ratio, therefore, asymmetries in oﬀspring recognition and in the reproductive
capacity between the two sexes will tend to reinforce polygynous tendencies in societies and at-
tenuate polyandrous ones that may originate from heterogeneities in the economic endowments
of women and men.
Finally, consider the case where the degree of complementarity between female and male
inputs into the production of household goods changes. As noted, the only household good
produced in marriage that unquestionably requires inputs ¿from both sexes are own children. In
our model, the degree of complementarity between female and male inputs into the production
of own kids (the only household good produced in our model) is measured by the inverse of the
parameter η, i.e. the elasticity of substitution between Q| and Q~ in the child quality function
(9). The lower is η, the more dependent are men and women on each other for parenting.
Because of asymmetries in oﬀspring recognition and in reproductive capacity between the two
sexes, however, child quality is of greater relative importance for the reproductive success of
women than it is for the reproductive success of men. Moreover, only women may increase
through extra-pair mating the number of additional contributors to the quality of their own
(alleged) oﬀspring. Men and women will therefore react diﬀerently to a fall in η. Women will
seek additional male partners, and men will seek less. An increase in η has the reverse eﬀect, as
mating now becomes more attractive to men and less attractive to women. A fall in η therefore
tends to promote polyandrous mating, whereas an increase in η encourages polygyny. Concerns
about uncertain paternity and a higher male than female reproductive rate, however, once again
attenuate the former type of mating and reinforce the latter. Evidence from polyandrous cultures
suggests that harsh environmental conditions may underlie the willingness of men to nevertheless
share a common a wife. Unable to support and care for own oﬀspring individually, men simply
have to collude, albeit at the risk of reproductive failure, to provide suﬃcient resources for
oﬀspring survival (see, for example, Crook and Crook, 1994).
Summarizing the above, in all marriage regimes does the institution of marriage serve the
purpose of regulating and organizing reproduction in society. The general entitlement of spouses
(and especially husbands) with exclusive reproductive property rights, the ubiquity of bans on
adultery, and the universality across marriage regimes of the legal principle of presumed paternity
underscore this function. Furthermore, there is ample evidence from the respective prevalences
and idiosyncratic characteristics of monogamous, polygynous, and polyandrous marriage regimes
20Also in cultures that are not polygynous, the reproductive success of men appears to depend positively on their
economic status (see Hopcroft, 2006, for an extensive literature review).
23that concerns about uncertain paternity rank prominently in societies’ eﬀorts to institutionalize,
enforce, and promote inter-sexual unions between the two sexes. Economic theories of marriage
have altogether disregarded this pivotal regulatory function performed by marriage in societies.
6.3. The Decline of Marriage
For ages, marriage has been a virtual precondition for childbearing. In many countries, it no
longer is (see, for example, Willis, 1999). The second half of the last century in particular has
witnessed a marked decline of marriage, as evinced by falling marriage rates, rising rates of
divorce, and growth of out-of-wedlock childbearing. At the same time, statistics on the average
level of schooling, daily nutrition, and health of children suggest that child quality has improved
substantially. Our model, though simple and stylized, is suitable to study qualitatively the
eﬀects of a number of legal, economic, and technological trends that are likely to underlie or at
least to have contributed to this demise of marriage. These include the no-fault revolution in
divorce laws, advancements in household technology, the expansion of the welfare state, and the
rise in female labor force participation. These trend changes are, of course, neither exogenous,
nor likely to be independent, but rather the product of yet other, potentially complex and
interrelated, societal and economic changes. For our present purpose, however, we will view
these changes as given, and examine their consequences for marriage and mating patterns as well
as for average parental investment levels within the framework of our theoretical model. Given
the postulated nature and purpose of marriage as a social institution, the following discussion
focuses in particular on the respective eﬀects these changes have on the attractiveness and
eﬀectiveness of marriage as a commitment device between partners for the bearing and rearing
of oﬀpring.
Many countries have adopted no-fault (unilateral or uncontested) divorce laws over the last
decades. Prior to no fault, mutual consent among spouses or proof of spousal marital misconduct
(fault) was required for divorce, and ﬁnancial settlements following divorce were dependent on
assessments of fault.21 To revoke marriage, therefore, has become both more easy and less
costly. In the context of our model, the no-fault revolution can be interpreted as a reduction
in the level of mating costs s. As shown in Sections 5.1 and 5.2, a decline in s leads to an
increase in promiscuity among previously monogamous individuals and to a decline in the level
of child quality. The introduction of no-fault divorce laws is therefore predicted to have made
marriage less eﬀective as a commitment device and to have reduced parental investment in
children. Supportive evidence for these predictions is provided in a number of studies for the
US, which exploit time lags in the introduction of no-fault divorce laws at the state level to
identify their eﬀects on marriage and divorce patterns, as well as child quality. According to
Rasul (2004), 10% of the overall decline in the marriage rate since 1970 can be attributed to the
adoption of unilateral divorce laws. Furthermore, Friedberg (1998) ﬁnds the latter to explain
21Traditional fault grounds include, among others, emotional or physical cruelty, adultery, and desertion.
2417% of the rise in divorces per capita in the period 1968 to 1988. Finally, as to child quality,
Gruber (2004) shows that children born under no-fault are subsequently less well educated and
have lower family incomes than children that grew up in fault states.
Improvements in household technology and the expansion of the welfare state are likely to
have reduced child quality costs a and the technical dependency of women and men on each
other with respect to their child quality contributions η. A decrease in a makes child quality
investments more attractive for both sexes (substitution eﬀect). However, expenditures on child
quality by women and men rise less than proportionally, as some of the economic resources
previously spent on child quality are now transferred to the mating market (income eﬀect).
Promiscuity, as a consequence, increases and thus paternal uncertainty (see Figure 2). Because
of the latter, the male share in total child quality investments falls (see Figure 4). For a given
strictness of marital arrangements, i.e. a given level of mating costs, therefore, the eﬀectiveness
of marriage in reducing paternal uncertainty declines when the costs of child quality fall. An
increase in η, in turn, makes mating less attractive for women (quality maximizers) and more
attractive for men (quantity maximizers). This asymmetric eﬀect is reﬂected in a higher male
share in total mating costs, as men reallocate resources from parenting to mating. The eﬀect on
promiscuity, however, depends on the level of mating costs. At low levels of mating costs, the
equilibrium number of partners increases. At high levels, it falls. In other words, the eﬀect of a
decrease in the technical dependency of the two sexes on each other with respect to child quality
depends on the strictness of marital arrangements. In line with the predictions on the eﬀects
of a fall in child quality costs a, Rosenzweig (1999) ﬁnds a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect of AFDC
(Aid to Families with Dependent Children) on the probability of out-of-wedlock childbearing for
low-income women in the US. Similarly, Lefebvre and Merrigan (1998) conclude that directing
welfare beneﬁts to single mothers in Canada has reduced their probability of remarriage.
In the last century, female labor supply has increased signiﬁcantly to the eﬀect that women,
on average, now have an independent command over greater economic resources. In our model,
a relative increase in the economic endowments of women Y~ leads to higher female expenditures
on consumption, maternal quality investments, and mating. Because of the latter, promiscuity
and the female share in total mating costs increase. Higher paternal uncertainty, in turn,
causes total child quality investments of a man to fall. Overall child quality, however, increases.
Marriage, therefore, becomes less eﬀective as a commitment device and less important as a
means for females to secure male contributions to child quality. Empirical evidence consistent
with these predicted outcomes is, for example, provided by Blau et al. (2000), who ﬁnd better
labor market prospects for white women in the US to have lowered their marriage rates.
As the preceding discussion has shown, a number of recent legal, technological, and societal
changes have combined forces to challenge both the attractiveness and the eﬀectiveness of mar-
riage. The no-fault revolution has turned marriage into a non-credible bond between individuals
by making conjugal unions easier and less expensive to revoke. Technological advances in house-
hold appliances, the expansion of the welfare state, and increases in the economic resources
25available to women have in turn reduced the dependency of women on men for child support
and parenting. With the exception of the no-fault revolution, these developments have also
tended to raise average levels of child quality. In sum, therefore, marriage has increasingly been
decoupled by these trends from its traditional domain, i.e. the bearing and rearing of children.
7. Conclusion
Well researched in other disciplines, such as evolutionary biology, sociology, anthropology, and
psychology, sex diﬀerences have long been recognized as important determinants of both indi-
vidual and group behavior. Not so in economics. Even economic theories of marriage have paid
little if any attention to the fundamental fact that conjugal unions are traditionally intersexual
in nature. Focusing on the advantages of joint household production and consumption to ac-
count for the existence of inter-personal unions, economic theories of marriage fail to explain why
either motive necessarily requires marriage, the presence of both sexes, or a social institution
to sanction such unions. Although the bearing and rearing of children is always mentioned as a
primary motive for marriage, economic theories of marriage generally lack an explicit account of
fertility decisions in their analysis. They also fail to provide a rationale for why society should
take any interest at all in the regulation of reproductive behavior. The traditionally intimate
relationship between childbearing and marriage, however, suggests that fertility considerations
must have been always central to both individual marriage decisions and the very role that the
institution of marriage performs in societies.
This paper has developed a ﬁrst microeconomic foundation for the institution of marriage.
In our account of the origin and purpose of this institution, fertility considerations both at the
individual and societal level are of primary importance. Based on a model of mating behavior,
reproduction, and parental investment in children, we have shown that marriage as an institution
can be explained as a societal response to mating market failure that arises from incomplete
information on individual paternity. By circumscribing promiscuity, the institution of marriage
makes paternity of men more certain and induces them to invest more in their putative oﬀspring.
Able to raise the welfare of both women and men, as well as average levels of parental care,
the institution of marriage can realize Pareto improvements that we believe are central to an
understanding of why societies around the world have at all times circumscribed the mating
behavior of individuals by endorsing and enforcing marriage as the preferred, if not the only
acceptable form of union between the two sexes. Our foundation of the institution of marriage is
consistent with both the traditional role of conjugal unions as the primary place for the bearing
and rearing of children in societies, and the general requirement of ﬁdelity between spouses.
For millennia an ubiquitous and central institution in societies, marriage has recently been
subject to a number of fundamental legal, economic, and societal changes that challenge both the
role and the eﬀectiveness of this long-standing institution. The no-fault revolution has turned
26marriage into a non-credible bond between individuals by making conjugal unions easier and less
expensive to revoke. Moreover, technological advances in household appliances, the expansion
of the welfare state, and increases in the economic resources available to women have reduced
the dependency of women on men for child support and parenting. In combination, these trends
have led to a decoupling of marriage from the bearing and rearing of children. Whether or not
these changes have the potential to permanently alter the role of marriage in societies is yet
not foreseeable. The recent marked trend decline in marriage rates in many countries, however,
suggests that the challenge posed by these profound changes to the institution of marriage
is a serious one indeed. Moreover, a new profound challenge may yet lie ahead, arising from
technological advances in the area of genetic paternity testing. For centuries, men had to rely on
mate guarding or marriage to reduce the risk of cuckoldry, and on but indirect cues to ascertain
their fatherhood ex post, such as the physical resemblance to their putative oﬀspring. Genetic
paternity testing, if universally applied, would render such measures obsolete. By eliminating
asymmetry in oﬀspring recognition, paternal uncertainty would cease to be a potent source of
mating market failure. Societies would have less reason to circumscribe the mating behavior of
individuals, and the institution of marriage would loose yet another, if not the most powerful
argument strengthening its case.
Appendix A. Social Optimum
Denote by ξ and (1 − ξ) the respective weights a social planner attaches to the utility of the
representative woman and man. We ﬁrst characterize the social optimum when the sex ratio
is balanced, and then describe optimal mating market outcomes when one sex outnumbers the
other.
If φ = 1, so that N = N~ = N|, a social planer would increase the number of mating partners
per individual, N ∈ N0, as long as the following inequality holds:
ξ(U(CN
~) − U(CN+1
~ )) + (1 − ξ)(U(CN
|) − U(CN+1
| )) ≤ (A1)
ξ(V(1,QN+1)−V(min{N,1},QN)) + (1−ξ)(EN+1[V(K|,QN+1)]−EN[V(K|,QN)]),
i.e. the weighted sum of losses in female and male non-reproductive utility is equal to or smaller
than the weighted increase in the utility of women and men from reproduction when resources
are transferred from non-reproductive consumption to the mating market and to parental invest-
ment. Note that in contrast to equations (14) and (17), increasing N above 1 (excess mating)
does not increase the expected utility from reproductive success per man because the planner
internalizes the spillover eﬀects of promiscuity on the probability of fatherhood δ and on to-
tal male quality contributions Q|. Concavity of V with respect to K implies that EN, which
operates under the binomial distribution with parameters N and 1
N, provides ceteris paribus a
higher level of utility than EN+1. While the expected number of oﬀspring is constantly one, its
27variance, which is equal to our measure of paternal uncertainty (1 − 1
N), increases in N which
leads to a loss in male utility. As a consequence, total male quality contributions also decline
when paternal uncertainty increases, i.e. QN
| > QN+1
| . Hence, there are no social beneﬁts from
excess mating and the optimal N is either 0 or 1. Reproduction, i.e. N = 1, is socially optimal
if:
V (1,Q) ≥ ξ(U(Y~) − U(Y~ − s~ − a~Q~)) + (1 − ξ)(U(Y|) − U(Y| − s| − a|Q|)), (A2)
where V (1,Q) denotes the joint utility of women and men from reproduction when paternity is
certain. Assuming (A2) holds, socially optimal child quality investments have to satisfy:
a~
a|
U′(Y~ − s~ − a~Q~)










Condition (A3) is obtained by dividing the respective ﬁrst order necessary conditions of the social
planer for female and male contributions to child quality. It requires that the ratio of female to
male marginal child quality costs, transformed in utility units, is equal to the technical rate of
substitution between female and male contributions in the child quality function (9). Note that
the weights ξ and 1 − ξ do not appear in the respective ﬁrst order necessary conditions for Q~
and Q|. Moreover, because of the public good nature of child quality, VQ is identical for women
and men and therefore irrelevant for the determination of the socially optimal level of child
quality investments. Mating costs s are divided among women (s~) and men (s|) by the social
planer such that the weighted marginal utilities of both sexes with respect to non-reproductive
consumption are equal:
ξU′(Y~ − s~ − a~Q~) = (1 − ξ)U′(Y| − s| − a|Q|). (A4)














Condition (A5) requires the ratio of marginal quality costs times the technical rate of substitution
to equal the ratio of the respective weights attached by the social planer to the utilities of men
and women. Note that the degree of substitutability between female and male contributions η
plays no role, if for instance α = ξ = 1
2 and a~ = a| = a. In this case, both parents contribute
equally to total child quality.
If φ  = 1, socially optimal allocations on the mating market will be diﬀerent. Optimality, how-
ever, still requires mating expenditures not to exceed the minimum necessary for reproduction
and paternity to be certain. In other words, a woman will be matched to but a single man
at most. If men outnumber women (φ > 1), this implies that a fraction (1 − φ−1) of men has
28to remain childless. If, in contrast, women outnumber men (φ < 1), then it will not only be
optimal for all men to reproduce, but even for some of them to father more than one child with
more than one woman.
Appendix B. Continuous Choice
For expository and analytical reasons, we have changed to a continuous choice of mating partners
in Section 5. Given our parametrization of the utility function (19), this change implies the
following ﬁrst order necessary conditions for the representative female. Her optimal investment
in child quality Q~ has to meet the condition:
γa~
￿
Y~ − s~N~ − a~Q~







and her optimal continuous choice of male mating partners N~ has to satisfy:
γs~
￿
Y~ − s~N~ − a~Q~







The expected utility of a man from reproduction is determined by the κ-th moment of the bi-
nomial distribution with N| draws (female partners) and probability of success (fatherhood)
δ:





As there is no closed-form representation of the κ-th moment of the binomial distribution, we
apply the delta method. Speciﬁcally, we use a third-order Taylor expansion of equation (B3)
around the representative man’s expected number of oﬀspring Ke
| = N|δ (see equation (6)) to
approximate the utility he receives from children as follows:













A third-order expansion is necessary because of the skewness of the binomial distribution that
determines the reproductive success of men. Only for symmetric distributions, i.e. for the special
case where δ = 1
2, will skewness have no inﬂuence on the utility maximization problem of men.
For given N| and δ, the expected utility the representative man derives from children is given
by:













29Hence, the marginal change in the expected utility a man derives from children due to a marginal


















In the continuous choice setting, expansions (B5) and (B6) allow to approximate the following
ﬁrst order necessary conditions for men with respect to q| and N|:













The solution to the model is described by the ﬁrst order necessary conditions (B1) and (B2)
for females, their counterparts for males (B7 with B5) and (B8 with B6), the market-clearing
condition for the mating market (11), and the mating cost constraint (12). This system of
equations is solved for Q~, N~, q|, N|, s~, and s|.
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